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Memory corruption vulnerabilities are endemic to unsafe
languages, such as C, and they can even be found in safe
languages that themselves are implemented in unsafe lan-
guages or linked with libraries implemented in unsafe lan-
guages. Robust compilation mitigates the threat of linking
with memory-unsafe libraries. e source language is a C-
like language, enriched with a notion of a component which
encapsulates data and code, exposing functionality through
well-dened interfaces. Robust compilation denes what
security properties a component still has, even, if one or
more components are compromised. e main contribution
of this work is to demonstrate that the compartmentaliza-
tion necessary for a compiler that has the robust compilation
property can be realized on a basic RISC processor using
soware fault isolation.
1 Problem and Motivation
Formal denitions of secure compilation have been proposed
by Juglaret et al. [7] and, more recently, by Garg et al. [4].
is work is part of the eort to propose a new denition for
robust compilation of unsafe low-level languages [3]. A com-
piler has the robust compilation property if any aack on a
compiled variant of a program (a set of components) that can
be mounted by a component linked and executed with it, can
also be mounted at the source level by a component. In the
source level semantics, it is impossible to write in another’s
component memory and only procedures exported by the
callee and imported by the caller can be called. us, for the
robust compilation property to hold, a strong machine-level
separation of the compiled program and the target context
is necessary. Juglaret et al.’s [6] implementation targeted a
micro-policy architecture [2] with special tagging capabili-
ties at the level of memory location. is work focuses on
supporting the new denition of secure compilation on a
generic RISC processor, without specialized hardware. We
use soware fault isolation [13] mechanisms to provide a
proof-of-concept implementation of a compiler back-end to
a basic RISC machine.
2 Background and Related Work
Soware fault isolation was proposed in 1993 by Wahbe et
al. [13]. A distrusted module is sandboxed into its own fault
domain, a logical region of the address space. To prevent
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it from modifying data or executing code belonging to the
rest of the application, its object code is instrumented. e
physical address is split logically into a segment id and oset,
and the introduced instrumentation does not allow writes
outside the data domain and execution to escape the code
domain, other than predened exit points. Many applications
that use soware fault isolation followed. Google’s Native
Client [14] uses soware fault isolation to sandbox C/C++
code in the Chrome web browser. Morrisse et al. [10]
proposed a semantics of the x86 architecture and constructed
a machine veried checker of Native Client. ARMor [15]
is a machine veried system that uses soware isolation to
sandbox application code running on embedded processors.
In this research, we combine ideas from this previous work
and apply them to support robust compilation on a processor
without specialized hardware.
Abadi [1] dened full abstraction as the property of a
compiler to preserve and reect observational equivalence.
Achieving observational equivalence in the presence of side
channels such as timing, is impossible. Instead, robust com-
pilation focuses on only mapping back to the source level a
context that induces a certain behavior on a program. e
robust compilation property for unsafe languages proposed
by Fachini et al. [3] is:
∀P CT t . CT ./ (P↓) ⇓ t ⇒ ∃CS t ′. CS ./ P ⇓ t ′ ∧ t ′ 4P t
at is, for all source-level programs P and all low-level
contexts CT there exists a source-level context CS , with no
undened behavior, such that the low-level trace t of com-
piled P linked with CT and source-level trace t ′ of P linked
with CS , match up to an undened behavior in P .
3 Approach and Uniqueness
e work presented in this abstract is part of a project [3]
that aims at dening a new security property that imple-
ments a proof-of-concept compiler from a C-like language
with components to two target machines: a generic RISC
processor and a micro-policy machine [2]. e generated
executable runs on the bare hardware with the back-end
compiler phase targeting the generic RISC processor. While
promising, the micro-policy machine [2] does not exist yet.
Here we target a generic load-store machine with no spe-
cialized hardware for protection. e novelty of this new
soware fault isolation implementation is that instead of
protecting an application from one or more potentially mali-
cious libraries, all components are potentially malicious and,
thus, mutually distrustful.
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In our approach, a source-level program is translated from
the C-like language with components to an intermediate
level language that uses a similar memory model to Comp-
Cert [9] enriched with a notion of component and interfaces
between components. e addresses are not resolved and
the interface calls between components are abstract. Our
work implements a compiler pass in Coq [12]. It takes this in-
termediate program and generates a RISC assembly program
that satises the following invariants:
1. a component can write only within its own data mem-
ory;
2. a component can only jump within its own code mem-
ory, except for predened exit points allowed by the
interface; and
3. if aer a call to another component, the execution is
transferred back to the callee component, then it will
always return to the instruction aer the call.
e assumptions in this research are that the basic RISC
machine has a minimal load-store instruction set. e regis-
ter le contains a set of registers dedicated to the soware
fault isolation instrumentation. e memory is unbounded
and it is split into slots. e slots are allocated statically to
each component and their type, code or data, is also statically
determined. A physical address is an unbounded integer,
with the bits starting from the least signicant: oset with
slot, component identier, slot identier. e oset and com-
ponent are bounded, and the slot identier is not. us, each
component has an unbounded memory, but a limit on the
contiguous memory it can allocate.
To enforce the rst two invariants, this work uses a strat-
egy from Wahbe et al. [13] that has two extra instructions
and three dedicated registers. Using binary bitwise opera-
tions on an address, the bits corresponding to the component
identier are set to the current one. All the data slots are odd
and the instrumentation for the store instruction sets the
least signicant bit of the slot. All the code slots are even and
the instrumentation for jump resets the least signicant bit
of the slot. us, no writes are possible in the code segment.
For the enforcement of the cross-component control ow,
we use a dedicated protected control stack and a dedicated
register for the stack pointer. e protected control stack is
kept in a reserved memory, which can be accessed only from
special instrumentation sequences. To ensure continuous
execution of a certain number of instructions needed for
managing the protected control stack, we align the instruc-
tions [10].
e rst two sandboxing invariants do not protect the
current executing component, but rather protect all other
components from it. Special care must be taken to protect
the control stack. First, the procedures called externally are
placed at an unaligned address and are preceded by a Halt
instruction. us spurious pushes onto the protected control
stack are avoided. Second, to avoid the error of popping
from an empty stack the execution starts with pushing the
address of a Halt instruction on the protected control stack
and, then the execution is transferred to the main function.
4 Results and Contributions
e project is implemented in Coq [12] and uses the ick-
Chick [11] framework to test the three invariants. A test
consists of the following steps: randomly generate interme-
diate program using ickChick’s primitives [8], compilate
with our proof-of-concept compiler, execute in simulator
with recording of a log specic to each invariant using a
state monad, and verify the log by a checker [8]. e inter-
mediate programs were syntactically correct and no tests
were discarded. Currently, we are working on simulating an
aack by randomly injecting a change to the data memory
of a component.
e robust compilation property denition cannot be di-
rectly applied at the the target level, where the addresses
are resolved and a certain layout in memory and instrumen-
tation are expected. Here, the adversarial context is linked
and compiled together with the program and the robust
compilation property is dened as:
∀P Ca t . ((Ca ./ P)↓) ⇓ t ⇒ ∃S t ′. S ./ P ⇓ t ′ ∧ t ′ 4P t (1)
In gure 1 the program P has three components, and it’s
linked with the adversarial component Ca . Together, they
are compiled and executed in the target machine semantic
and produce the trace t . By robust compilation, there exists
a component S , with no undened behavior, such that: S
together with P can be executed in the intermediate semantic,
producing a trace t ′. e trace t ′ is a prex of trace t until S
induces and undened behavior in P .
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Figure 1. Robust Compilation Intermediate to Target
In conclusion, we designed and implemented a compiler
transformation from a RISC-like intermediate language to
a basic RISC assembly language that uses soware fault
isolation mechanisms to provide the memory and control
ow separation required by the robust compilation property.
We tested the implementation using property based testing
[5] and the ickChick framework [11].
e robust compilation property does not require special-
ized hardware. More work is needed to support system calls
and dynamic loading, but this is an encouraging rst step.
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